Entradas
“... and the project was finally implemented” (May – June 2006)
The situation could not be more discouraging after the latest attack on the ICRC. Nonetheless, our national staff insisted on the fact that access was still possible; only the appropriate people had to be contacted, in the correct manner, and at the correct time. In our case, the main actors we had to deal with were the Nomadic-Arabic tribes, that who throughout the conflict have been benefiting from the support provided by Khartoum. An extraordinary challenge, which very few organisations had previously faced in the Jebel Marra.
First of all, you need to know and figure out who is who among this population: sheikhs, omdas or sertais[1]?, civilian leaders or leaders of Janjaweed militias[2]?, formal or informal links with the Government? Dozens of cups of tea, conversations in the marketplace, information contrasted with the rest of organisations, and an extraordinary support from the capital helped us to untangle the jumble. Secondly, we had to ensure access: as of May 1st we went from village to village, accompanied by previously identified key leaders, and met the representatives of each and every one of the seven tribes present in the area; we did not take a step until everything was totally guaranteed. And, thirdly, to our surprise, all of the information gathered led to the same conclusion: in the Jebel Marra a blatant violation of the principle of impartiality had been committed. Most of the organisations had focused their activities on the area under SLA control, using as an access way the areas under the influence of these Arabic tribes as an access way. This population had seen how tons and tons of humanitarian aid channelled by several organisations crossed their territory. In the best of cases, some jawaya[3] sat with the leaders for a few minutes and promised exploratory missions that never materialized. This situation went on for months, creating among Nomadic-Arabic communities comprehensible distrust towards the presence of humanitarian organisations that led to the aforementioned (unjustified) attacks.
It is when humanitarian principles crack that we remember the need to comply: we soon realised that to be able to reach Killin we would have to offset our presence in the rebel area by carrying out activities in the government Arabic Janjaweed area too. In fact, we had to earn this these people’s trust, responding to needs that had not even been assessed beforehand and planning an intervention accordingly. As a result of this analysis, activities started in the area of Gorne and Guildo, an area inhabited by 30,000 people gathered in these villages and characterized by the presence of Nomadic-Arabic populations within a sui generis microcosm. The visibility and explanation of our identity would be key elements to maximize the medical impact and ensure the use of the road leading to Killin. One month conducting mobile clinics in the forgans[4] and supervising derelict clinics abandoned four months back by other organisations in Gorne and Guildo have enabled us, to date, to freely travel along this once “cursed” road. After reactivating the provision of medical care in this area, on June 30th last we finally arrived in Killin.
MSF-OCBA is today the only organisation having an ongoing expatriate presence and regular activities in the area between Gorne and Killin, a rural area under medieval living standards inhabited by 150,000 people, of whom more than a third are internally displaced persons (IDPs). An area divided by a mobile frontline crossing the today ghost village of Golo that fluctuates on a weekly basis. An area where tension and violence are sowed by the Army, the rebels, the Janjaweed militias, rivalries between tribes (also on occasions, within the tribes themselves) and the political control exerted from Khartoum. An area to which no other international or non-governmental organisation is planning to return to in the short term.
The project, made up of two teams (doctor, nurse and logistician) and a Field Coordinator has just started. Today, July 1st, activities have set out started in Killin: eighty consultations at the clinic, five severely malnourished children admitted, two emergency surgical interventions and this afternoon the first delivery... A beautiful project has just been born.
[1] A sheik is a first rank community leader present in each village; there are usually dozens of them, even though power is in the hands of only about four or five of them. An omda is an important community leader, usually controlling several villages and therefore having many sheiks under him. A shertai is a civil leader and on occasions a political leader, placed above the omdas.
[2] The combination of roles and the variety of combinations have increased since the conflict started, as the traditional community organisation has been influenced by the concurrence of new actors, such as the Army or the Arabic militias. Thus, the agid is usually a sheik or an omda that has played an important role during the war, i.e. he has or has had soldiers or armed militias under him.
[3] Term used in Sudan to refer to white people, like muzungu in many African countries.
[4] Arabic-Nomadic habitat made up of about one hundred families gathered in the bush, living in tents.Pon aquí el resto del artículo
The situation could not be more discouraging after the latest attack on the ICRC. Nonetheless, our national staff insisted on the fact that access was still possible; only the appropriate people had to be contacted, in the correct manner, and at the correct time. In our case, the main actors we had to deal with were the Nomadic-Arabic tribes, that who throughout the conflict have been benefiting from the support provided by Khartoum. An extraordinary challenge, which very few organisations had previously faced in the Jebel Marra.
First of all, you need to know and figure out who is who among this population: sheikhs, omdas or sertais[1]?, civilian leaders or leaders of Janjaweed militias[2]?, formal or informal links with the Government? Dozens of cups of tea, conversations in the marketplace, information contrasted with the rest of organisations, and an extraordinary support from the capital helped us to untangle the jumble. Secondly, we had to ensure access: as of May 1st we went from village to village, accompanied by previously identified key leaders, and met the representatives of each and every one of the seven tribes present in the area; we did not take a step until everything was totally guaranteed. And, thirdly, to our surprise, all of the information gathered led to the same conclusion: in the Jebel Marra a blatant violation of the principle of impartiality had been committed. Most of the organisations had focused their activities on the area under SLA control, using as an access way the areas under the influence of these Arabic tribes as an access way. This population had seen how tons and tons of humanitarian aid channelled by several organisations crossed their territory. In the best of cases, some jawaya[3] sat with the leaders for a few minutes and promised exploratory missions that never materialized. This situation went on for months, creating among Nomadic-Arabic communities comprehensible distrust towards the presence of humanitarian organisations that led to the aforementioned (unjustified) attacks.
It is when humanitarian principles crack that we remember the need to comply: we soon realised that to be able to reach Killin we would have to offset our presence in the rebel area by carrying out activities in the government Arabic Janjaweed area too. In fact, we had to earn this these people’s trust, responding to needs that had not even been assessed beforehand and planning an intervention accordingly. As a result of this analysis, activities started in the area of Gorne and Guildo, an area inhabited by 30,000 people gathered in these villages and characterized by the presence of Nomadic-Arabic populations within a sui generis microcosm. The visibility and explanation of our identity would be key elements to maximize the medical impact and ensure the use of the road leading to Killin. One month conducting mobile clinics in the forgans[4] and supervising derelict clinics abandoned four months back by other organisations in Gorne and Guildo have enabled us, to date, to freely travel along this once “cursed” road. After reactivating the provision of medical care in this area, on June 30th last we finally arrived in Killin.
MSF-OCBA is today the only organisation having an ongoing expatriate presence and regular activities in the area between Gorne and Killin, a rural area under medieval living standards inhabited by 150,000 people, of whom more than a third are internally displaced persons (IDPs). An area divided by a mobile frontline crossing the today ghost village of Golo that fluctuates on a weekly basis. An area where tension and violence are sowed by the Army, the rebels, the Janjaweed militias, rivalries between tribes (also on occasions, within the tribes themselves) and the political control exerted from Khartoum. An area to which no other international or non-governmental organisation is planning to return to in the short term.
The project, made up of two teams (doctor, nurse and logistician) and a Field Coordinator has just started. Today, July 1st, activities have set out started in Killin: eighty consultations at the clinic, five severely malnourished children admitted, two emergency surgical interventions and this afternoon the first delivery... A beautiful project has just been born.
[1] A sheik is a first rank community leader present in each village; there are usually dozens of them, even though power is in the hands of only about four or five of them. An omda is an important community leader, usually controlling several villages and therefore having many sheiks under him. A shertai is a civil leader and on occasions a political leader, placed above the omdas.
[2] The combination of roles and the variety of combinations have increased since the conflict started, as the traditional community organisation has been influenced by the concurrence of new actors, such as the Army or the Arabic militias. Thus, the agid is usually a sheik or an omda that has played an important role during the war, i.e. he has or has had soldiers or armed militias under him.
[3] Term used in Sudan to refer to white people, like muzungu in many African countries.
[4] Arabic-Nomadic habitat made up of about one hundred families gathered in the bush, living in tents.Pon aquí el resto del artículo
0 comentarios:
Publicar un comentario en la entrada