Darfur 2006: Part I
Jebel Marra: an intervention in the old fashion (February - April 2006)
The entire expatriate team of MSF Spain (MSFE) in Golo had to be evacuated on January 24th 2006 following over 36 hours of intense fighting between the SLA (Sudan Liberation Army) rebel forces and the soldiers of the Sudanese Army. Until then, the area had benefited from a status quo overtly accepted by both parties. The reasons for which the SLA broke the agreement have not been clarified as of yet. The consequences have been ill-fated, as there they are always are in such cases, for the civilian population: nearly 50,000 people were forced to flee from their homes to neighbouring Killin carrying the few belongings they managed to take with them (mainly food) to neighbouring Killin – as advised by the arrival of Arabic militias (Janjaweed) when the SLA withdrew after having experienced the brutal reprisals of these armed groups, responsible for the worst carnage ever perpetrated in Darfur.
Since then and until March 25th last, not one international or national humanitarian organisation was able to gain access to an area whose initial population multiplied by three in less than a week. During that time, the already inadequate local survival means deteriorated reaching the limits of human tragedy. The few witnesses that managed to arrive in the more easily accessible villages reported a situation of extreme vulnerability. This information was confirmed by different rebel and government sources, both “concerned” about the conditions of the civilian population that had fled Golo.
There were several attempts to directly assess these needs, one of the essential pillars of any quality humanitarian intervention. Between January 26th and February 17th, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), MSF-E and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) were subjected to attacks and looting by armed groups. At that moment, it became clear that humanitarian organisations were not welcome in the Jebel Marra Mountains. Any access by road was impossible due to the wave of strategic attacks and counterattacks to take control over the area. Basic humanitarian assistance, however, remained out of reach of for the population.
The MSF-E team managed to get posted in the village of Killin by air on March 13th. The assessment allowed enabled us to concluded that the vulnerability situation was indeed a matter for concern: a potential meningitis epidemic and a massive population displacement offered the perfect combination of elements for it. Other warning signs ended closed this cycle of conflict, displacement and vulnerability: local food distributions came to an end, forcing families to ration their diets. The lack of appropriate shelter, water and sanitation generated diarrhoea, pneumonia and related diseases. GOAL definitely suspended activities, confirming that in the short and mid term there would not be any healthcare provider in the area.
The entire expatriate team of MSF Spain (MSFE) in Golo had to be evacuated on January 24th 2006 following over 36 hours of intense fighting between the SLA (Sudan Liberation Army) rebel forces and the soldiers of the Sudanese Army. Until then, the area had benefited from a status quo overtly accepted by both parties. The reasons for which the SLA broke the agreement have not been clarified as of yet. The consequences have been ill-fated, as there they are always are in such cases, for the civilian population: nearly 50,000 people were forced to flee from their homes to neighbouring Killin carrying the few belongings they managed to take with them (mainly food) to neighbouring Killin – as advised by the arrival of Arabic militias (Janjaweed) when the SLA withdrew after having experienced the brutal reprisals of these armed groups, responsible for the worst carnage ever perpetrated in Darfur.
Since then and until March 25th last, not one international or national humanitarian organisation was able to gain access to an area whose initial population multiplied by three in less than a week. During that time, the already inadequate local survival means deteriorated reaching the limits of human tragedy. The few witnesses that managed to arrive in the more easily accessible villages reported a situation of extreme vulnerability. This information was confirmed by different rebel and government sources, both “concerned” about the conditions of the civilian population that had fled Golo.
There were several attempts to directly assess these needs, one of the essential pillars of any quality humanitarian intervention. Between January 26th and February 17th, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), MSF-E and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) were subjected to attacks and looting by armed groups. At that moment, it became clear that humanitarian organisations were not welcome in the Jebel Marra Mountains. Any access by road was impossible due to the wave of strategic attacks and counterattacks to take control over the area. Basic humanitarian assistance, however, remained out of reach of for the population.
The MSF-E team managed to get posted in the village of Killin by air on March 13th. The assessment allowed enabled us to concluded that the vulnerability situation was indeed a matter for concern: a potential meningitis epidemic and a massive population displacement offered the perfect combination of elements for it. Other warning signs ended closed this cycle of conflict, displacement and vulnerability: local food distributions came to an end, forcing families to ration their diets. The lack of appropriate shelter, water and sanitation generated diarrhoea, pneumonia and related diseases. GOAL definitely suspended activities, confirming that in the short and mid term there would not be any healthcare provider in the area.
The pertinence of an intervention by MSF-E therefore left no room for doubt. However, two months after the attack access was still denied. The United Nations considered the area to be a “no-go-area” due to the presence of unexploded devices (UXO) and to the overall insecurity situation stemming from the conflict. Government authorities still failed to guarantee their control over armed groups officially known as “bandits”. Rebel forces warned us, for the first time since MSF entered Darfur in 2003, not to set foot in the Jebel Marra...
During the following days, access did not improve at all; so we decided to take more risks. It was an intervention in the old fashion. After discarding all known routes, on March 25th we hit a road that had not been previously used by us: a nine-hour drive along a labyrinth formed by tangled paths and enraged hills, only used by traders and herdsmen in the area as an access and getaway route. The aim: post a medical team and a 900kg cargo of medical supplies that would allow a first emergency response. Four camels and five donkeys were needed for this. The team stayed in the area 12 days. During that time, and based on the existing resources during the Golo project (MSF structures and national staff), a small clinic was set up in Killin where from day one an average of 110 daily medical consultations were implemented. Furthermore, 15 severely malnourished children were received, not only confirming that food security was already in a bad way but also that the situation would be critical in a matter of weeks. Most of the diseases treated (diarrhoea, dysentery and skin infections) reflected the lack of quality water and access precariousness. Surgical interventions were undertaken, including combatants with gunshot injuries. The intervention was completed with two in-depth assessments of reported meningitis cases and the vulnerability profile of the internally displaced persons (IDPs). The alert level for meningitis was reached in one of the areas, including nine suspected cases and one confirmed case; as for the IDPs, the greatest risk was posed by the consequences that could derive from the overcrowded conditions in the villages after the massive flight from Golo.
Today, three months since the assessment took place, the political-humanitarian landscape does not leave much room for hope. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has even failed to make the parties in the conflict sit and talk about opening a humanitarian corridor
Jebel Marra does not exist in on the maps of many bodies, agencies and humanitarian organisations, normally used to working near the capitals. The simple fact of having deployed a team in Killin elevates proximity as a fundamental value of our action and an essential element to lobbying the actors responsible for this shameful denial of humanitarian space. In fact, the moves in the capital have started bearing fruit and there are talks about the opening of the main access artery to Golo by road. This would enable us to go back to the area under normal conditions to resume the so far remote control operations we have in Killin, carry on assessing medical needs, including Nomadic-Arabic groups, and revitalize the hospital in Golo when the population returns. Should this not occur, we will have to plan again an intervention in the old fashion way again. The advantage of using donkeys and camels is that they have no problem whatsoever to overcome the barriers hindering humanitarian access some put up.
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